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INTRODUCTION 
This case is about Medicaid reimbursement for a bone marrow transplant for Sean 
Daugaard, a 5-year-old boy with Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, life-threatening cancer. 
The Division of Health Care Financing ("DHCF" or "Agency") does not dispute the 
medical necessity of the procedure, the appropriateness of care, or Sean's eligibility for 
Medicaid assistance. Rather, the DHCF denied reimbursement to Primary Children's 
Hospital solely because the Hospital did not fax the prior authorization request form 
before performing the transplant. Thus, the DHCF attempts to boil the entire case down 
into a simplistic syllogism: The rules require prior authorization, and the Hospital did 
not request prior authorization; therefore, the Hospital is not entitled to reimbursement. 
However, this mechanical analysis deceptively ignores the key, unchallenged 
points of the Hospital's case: (1) the rules nowhere specify nonpayment as the automatic 
penalty for lack of prior authorization alone; (2) the DHCF itself prevented prior 
authorization by its own misrepresentation that Sean was not Medicaid-eligible upon 
admission to the Hospital; (3) the DHCF deviated from prior practice by failing to notify 
the Hospital of its error upon reinstating Sean's eligibility; (4) the purposes for prior 
authorization can be served as well in this case through retroactive authorization; (5) the 
DHCF deviated from prior practice by denying retroactive authorization for admittedly 
necessary and proper care; and (6) denial of reimbursement on these facts produces an 
unjust result that is likely to deter future participation in the Medicaid program. 
Based on these unrefuted points, the Agency's decision denying payment for 
Sean's transplant service must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DENIAL OF PAYMENT FOR LACK OF PRIOR 
AUTHORIZATION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND PRIOR 
AGENCY PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND IS 
OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
A, Application of Statutes and Regulations. 
The Hospital demonstrated in its opening brief that the statutes and regulations do 
not specify nonpayment as the penalty for lack of prior authorization of otherwise 
necessary and appropriate services. (Pet. Br. 13-14.) To summarize, the prior 
authorization provision itself contains no penalty. U.A.C. R414-10A-6(1). The sole 
purpose of the prior authorization requirement is to verify that services are necessary and 
appropriate. See U.C.A. § 26-18-2.3(2)(a). The Agency concedes this purpose. (Br. of 
Aplee. 11.) Consistent with that purpose, the Agency is authorized to deny payment only 
for "services that fail to meet criteria . . . concerning medical necessity or 
appropriateness." U.C.A. § 26-18-2.3(1). Accordingly, in cases such as the present, 
where necessity and appropriateness of care are admitted, lack of prior authorization 
alone is not a valid basis to withhold payment. No purpose is served by withholding 
payment in this case. 
Moreover, necessity and appropriateness of care can be determined as easily and 
accurately after the procedure as before, without any risk or loss to the Agency. The 
entire risk of proceeding without prior authorization is on the provider, not the Agency. 
If a provider proceeds without prior authorization, it risks that its services may 
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subsequently be determined unnecessary or inappropriate. In such a case, payment is 
appropriately denied on the statutory grounds that the services fail to meet criteria for 
"medical necessity or appropriateness," 26-18-2.3(1), not for lack of prior authorization. 
The Agency argues that it needs information regarding necessity and 
appropriateness of care to guard against "unnecessary utilization of services," citing the 
prior authorization regulation. (Br. of Aplee. 11.) However, the Agency fails to mention 
that such supporting information can be, and generally is, submitted after the prior 
authorization request, with the only consequence being "delay [in] processing the 
request." R414-10A-6(2). As a matter of routine practice, and as conceded by Agency 
counsel, the "prior authorization" requirement is met by simply faxing a prior 
authorization request form to the Agency and supplying the supporting information as it 
is gathered later. (Tr. 73-74, 93-94.) Thus, payment was denied in this case, not for 
failure to obtain prior authorization, but solely for failure to request prior authorization. 
(Reply Add. 12.) Any actual authorization or approval comes in the form of payment 
following the services. The Agency can thus perform its safeguarding function whether 
authorization is requested before or after the service. The only departure from the 
routine in this case is that the prior authorization request form was prepared on the last 
day of hospitalization rather than the first day, and that departure was attributable to the 
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Agency's own misinformation regarding Sean's eligibility. The Agency was in no way 
disadvantaged by the late authorization request.1 
The Agency cites U.A.C. R414-10-5 for the proposition that lack of prior 
authorization provides independent grounds to withhold payment for services in this 
case. (Br. of Aplee. 12.) However, that provision refers to coverage of physician 
services. In this case, obviously, the Hospital seeks reimbursement for provision of 
inpatient hospital services, which is governed by a different regulation, R414-2A, which 
provision contains no specific authorization to withhold payment for lack of prior 
authorization. 
In summary, lack of a prior authorization request cannot be invoked as a basis to 
deny payment when such authorization was prevented by the Agency's own 
misrepresentation regarding Sean's Medicaid eligibility, and the purpose of prior 
authorization, to verify necessity and appropriateness of care, is admittedly satisfied. 
Here, the Agency lulled the Hospital into an informal practice of prior authorization that 
permitted the authorization request form to be faxed whenever eligibility was established, 
with supporting information provided on an ongoing basis, and with actual approval 
returned sometime after review of the information and completion of the services. In 
The Agency asserts that failure to have a utilization review plan would jeopardize its participation 
in the Medicaid program. (Br. of Aplee. 12.) However, the Hospital is not suggesting that utilization 
review is unimportant or not legally required. Rather, the Hospital's position is simply that such review 
can and generally does follow the service, without diminishing the purpose or benefit of the review, when 
prior authorization cannot be obtained. Agency counsel admitted that the Agency has followed such a 
policy in the past. (Tr. 15-16.) 
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other words, the Agency has never strictly required prior authorization, but merely 
submission of a prior authorization request form as soon as eligibility was established. 
At trial, the Agency did not assert lack of prior authorization, but merely failure to fax a 
prior authorization request form before the transplant. (Tr. 93-94.) However, the 
Agency may not, upon receiving a large bill that it does not want to pay, simply ignore 
past practice and invoke a strict interpretation of prior authorization to avoid payment. 
Such conduct is not only unauthorized by the Medicaid statutes and regulations, but is 
unlawful, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedures Act, 
section 63-46b-16(4)(d) and (h). 
B. Analysis of Agency Case Law, 
The Agency relies principally on South Davis Community Hosp., Inc. v. 
Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1994), to support denial of payment in 
this case; however, that case is distinguishable, both factually and legally. In South 
Davis, the court upheld denial of Medicaid reimbursement because the hospital failed to 
provide a required preadmission certification that the proposed services were needed. Id. 
at 982-83. However, that result was justified because necessity of the services was 
disputed; denial of reimbursement was based on the hospital's "own inaction," id. at 984; 
the patient's eligibility was never in question; the hospital never did certify a need for the 
services; there was no provision for, or practice of, retroactive certification; and denial 
was reviewed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. By contrast, in the 
present case the Agency's own misrepresentation of ineligibility upon admission 
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precluded submission of the prior authorization form; that form could not be submitted 
until after eligibility was reestablished. In addition, here the Agency concedes the 
necessity and appropriateness of the service, and the Hospital did submit the required 
form, albeit at the end of hospitalization instead of the beginning. Moreover, the 
Agency's own regulations and practice permitted retroactive authorization of services, 
justifying review of its action under the higher correction-of-error standard. See U.A.C. 
R414-10A-4(5); U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(ii)-(iii). 
The Agency also cites Mercy Hospital v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 492 
A.2d 104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985), to support nonpayment. However, that case merely 
illustrates the harshness and injustice that can result from mechanical application of 
regulations. There, the state denied reimbursement for the care of a patient whose 
transfer to another facility was prevented by the state's own delay in approving the 
transfer. The hospital argued that the state was equitably estopped to deny 
reimbursement, but the court denied relief because "no misrepresentations were made by 
[the state]." Id. at 106. By contrast, the Agency in the present case indisputably 
misrepresented that Sean was Medicaid ineligible upon admission and failed to notify the 
Hospital upon correcting his eligibility status. Moreover, the present case is based not 
only on estoppel, but on express provision for retroactive authorization and relief from 
inconsistent agency practice. 
The third case relied on by the Agency, Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. Mar saw, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 696 (D. Tenn. 1998), is also distinguishable because it is a private insurance 
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coverage case governed by ERISA. There, the health insurer denied coverage for 
hospital services because the claim was submitted beyond the one-year claims period set 
out in the policy. The policy expressly made timely submission of the claim a condition 
to payment of benefits. Id. at 702. The court merely held that it was not arbitrary or 
capricious for the insurer to follow its policy. Id. at 700-02. The court denied relief 
under equitable estoppel because the insurer had made no representation that it would 
deviate from its policy terms. Id. at 703-04. By contrast, unlike the policy in Mar saw, 
the Agency's regulations here do not authorize withholding payment solely for lack of 
prior authorization. Moreover, again, the present case is reviewed for correction of error, 
not merely abuse of discretion. Finally, equitable estoppel does apply in the present case 
because the Agency misrepresented Sean's eligibility status, precluding submission of 
the prior authorization form upon admission. 
In summary, the cases relied on by the Agency do not compel the harsh and 
inequitable result of denying reimbursement for Sean's transplant in this case. 
C. The Agency Has Failed to Refute the Legal Grounds for Relief. 
The Agency now asserts that it does not concede appropriateness of the 
transplant services rendered to Sean, and that appropriateness cannot be presumed for 
lack of evidence in the record. (Br. of Aplee. 19.) This is a bad faith argument. 
The Agency reviewed Sean's medical records in November 1997 and initially 
recommended denial of payment based on several different provisions of R414-10A-6(3) 
and R414-10A-9(2)-(5), none of which is lack of prior authorization. (See Agency Case 
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Summary, Pet. Add. 20.) In fact, the Agency skipped right over subparts (1) and (2) of 
R414-10A-6, which do refer to lack of prior authorization. By skipping over those 
provisions, the Agency implicitly accepted the request for retroactive authorization and 
denied payment based solely on lack of medical documentation. (See cited regulations, 
Pet. Add. 54-57.) This basis for denial was plainly set forth in the Agency's written 
Notice of Denial Due To Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria, dated December 
24, 1997. (R. 4; Reply Add. 1.) In a letter dated January 7, 1998, the Hospital responded 
that the documentation cited by the Agency had already been provided and could not be 
more clear. (R. 3, Reply Add. 5.) On March 4, 1998, apparently concerned with the 
sufficiency of its grounds for denial, the Agency sent an Amended Notice of Denial Due 
to Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria, adding lack of prior authorization, R414-
10A-6(1), as a basis for denial. (R. 27, Reply Add. 6.) On July 23, 1998, just three 
weeks prior to the hearing, the Agency sent a second Amended Notice of Denial Due to 
Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria, dropping all grounds relating to 
documentation of necessity and appropriateness of care, and listing only lack of a prior 
authorization request as the basis for denial of payment. (R. 75, Reply Add. 11-12.) 
By abandoning all grounds for denial related to necessity and appropriateness of 
care, the Agency conceded that those grounds do not exist, and that the services rendered 
were necessary and appropriate. Moreover, that Agency admission rendered evidence on 
those issues unnecessary and immaterial. In response to the hearing officer's question of 
whether the issue in the case was compliance with Medicaid criteria or "merely a prior 
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authorization issue," the Agency's own counsel responded that "it's merely a prior 
authorization issue." (Tr. 6.) Accordingly, the Agency cannot frame the issue at trial to 
make evidence on necessity and appropriateness of care immaterial, and later assert on 
appeal that necessity and appropriateness have not been established for lack of evidence. 
The Agency disputes the Hospital's assertion that the prior authorization rule has 
never been applied to withhold payment for admittedly reasonable and necessary 
services, citing the South Davis case. (Br. of Aplee. 19.) However, in South Davis, 
necessity of services was not admitted; it was the central dispute. The court denied 
reimbursement not only for lack of prior certification of necessity, but for lack of any 
certification, rejecting the mere submission of medical records as the equivalent of 
certification. 869P.2dat 983. By contrast, as shown above, the Agency in this case 
concedes necessity of the services. Where necessity is conceded, withholding payment 
for not faxing a prior authorization form upon admission is not only unlawful, and a 
departure from prior practice, but arbitrary and capricious, as it serves no purpose. 
Moreover, contrary to the Agency's assertion, this argument does not mean that the 
Agency can "no longer require prior authorization." (Br. of Aplee. 19.) It only means 
that prior authorization alone cannot be used to deny payment when the purpose of such 
review (verification of necessity and appropriateness of care) is admittedly satisfied. 
The Agency also denies that it acted contrary to prior practice. (Br. of Aplee. 19-
20.) However, the Agency confuses the testimony and overlooks the express findings 
and conclusions of the hearing officer. With regard to prior authorization, the Agency 
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departed from prior practice by failing to inform the Hospital of Sean's corrected 
Medicaid eligibility status on July 9. (See Pet. Br. 17-19.) The evidence was undisputed 
that the Agency "routinely" informed the Hospital of eligibility updates. (Tr. 29.) The 
hearing officer so found: "Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairborn when cases 
become eligible [S]he failed to inform Mr. Fairborn of Sean's eligibility." (Finding 
No. 13, Pet. Add. 5.) While that finding is correct, it does not support the hearing 
officer's contrary conclusion of law. The officer concluded that Lucero had no duty to 
inform the Hospital of eligibility changes, "although that had been her custom." 
(Conclusion No. 1, Pet. Add. 5.) The Hospital was substantially prejudiced by Lucero's 
departure from prior practice, because if the Hospital had been informed of Sean's 
corrected eligibility status on July 9, it could easily have submitted the prior authorization 
request form, instead of submitting a new Medicaid application, as directed by Lucero. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act mandates relief from such inconsistent agency 
action. 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).2 
Finally, the Agency attempts to distinguish several of the cases cited by the 
Hospital; however, the discussion is not helpful or relevant because it is offered without 
reference to the legal context in which the cases were cited. (Br. of Aplee. 20-23.) 
2
 The other instance of inconsistent Agency action is established by the testimony of Bernadette 
McNally, to which the Agency refers on page 19 of its brief. However, this testimony pertains to the 
Agency's practice of retroactive authorization, and is therefore best reserved for discussion in connection 
with that separate legal theory. By discussing the McNally testimony in connection with the prior 
authorization argument, the Agency has either confused the issues or overlooked the separate instance of 
inconsistent conduct discussed above, as established by the testimony of Richard Fairborn. 
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The Agency attempts to distinguish Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 858 P.2d 
187 (Utah App. 1993), requiring consistency of agency action, by asserting that "no 
evidence was presented at the hearing" to establish departure from prior Agency practice. 
(Br. of Aplee. 20.) However, that assertion is false and demonstrates bad faith. As 
shown above, Mr. Fairborn testified of inconsistent Agency action in failing to notify 
him of Sean's corrected eligibility status. (Tr. 29; see Pet. Br. 17-19.) Bernadette 
McNally testified of inconsistent Agency action in denying retroactive authorization of 
the services (Tr. 70), and Agency counsel conceded such prior practice (Tr. 15-16). (See 
Pet. Br. 23-24.) Accordingly, the record plainly establishes inconsistent Agency practice. 
The cases of Ladd v. Thomas, 962 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1997), and Dodson v. 
Parham, Ml F. Supp. 97 (D. Ga. 1977), were cited to show that, even absent a prior 
practice, the Agency had a due process duty to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected 
status. (Pet. Br. 19, n.4.) The cases of McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp. 633 (D. 
Fla. 1992), Pittman v. Secretary, Florida DHRS, 998 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1993), and 
Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1993), were cited to show that Medicaid 
coverage is mandated for bone marrow transplants on recipients under age twenty-one. 
(Pet. Br. 12.) The cases of Society of the New York Hospital v. Mogensen, 319 N.Y.S.2d 
258 (Misc. 1971), and In re Nemis, 351 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976), were cited to 
show that Medicaid reimbursement should not be denied for technical noncompliance 
with "procedural niceties," but that courts should "slice through the bureaucracy to insure 
that payment is made to the innocent vendor." (Pet. Br. 15-16.) The Agency's effort to 
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lump all these cases together and to distinguish them on grounds unrelated to those for 
which they were cited, or on the basis of immaterial fact variations, is unavailing. 
In summary, the Agency has failed to refute the legal grounds justifying relief 
from its administrative decision. The Agency has cited no authority to withhold payment 
solely for lack of prior authorization of otherwise necessary and appropriate services. 
The Agency does not dispute that its agent falsely informed the Hospital that Sean was 
Medicaid ineligible upon admission, or that the agent failed to notify the Hospital upon 
correcting Sean's eligibility status that same day. Nor does the Agency dispute that its 
failure to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected status was a departure from prior 
Agency practice. The Agency's new argument, that the Hospital could have avoided this 
dispute by seeking prior authorization before Sean's admission to the Hospital (Br. of 
Aplee. 21), is merely wishful thinking that does not change the facts. The Hospital had 
no duty to seek authorization prior to admission; in fact, the prior authorization request 
form is typically transmitted upon hospital admission because the patient's condition and 
treatment plan may, and often do, change prior to admission. The Agency was not 
"prevented from performing its statutory oversight duties" (Br. of Aplee. 23) because the 
Agency received and reviewed all necessary records and documentation and conceded 
that the care was necessary and appropriate. Finally, the Hospital did not "abdicate] its 
responsibility to get prior authorization" for Sean's transplant (Br. of Aplee. 24), as it was 
prevented from doing so by the Agency's own misrepresentation and departure from prior 
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practice. Based on these facts and legal principles, the Hospital is entitled to 
reimbursement for the services rendered.3 
POINT II: DENIAL OF RETROACTIVE AUTHORIZATION IS CONTRARY 
TO LAW AND PRIOR AGENCY PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION, AND IS OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
The Hospital demonstrated in its opening brief two separate grounds for 
retroactive authorization of Sean's transplant procedure: (1) Rule R414-10A-4(5); and 
(2) prior Agency practice. (Pet. Br. 22-25.) In response, the Agency attempts to combine 
the analysis by arguing both the facts of this case and prior Agency practice under the 
elements of R414-10A-4(5). (Br. of Aplee. 25-26.) However, the two grounds must be 
considered separately. 
A. Rule Providing Retroactive Authorization. 
First, the Agency argues that R414-10A-4(5) does not apply because that 
provision applies only to "emergency circumstances," and Sean's transplant was not an 
emergency because the Hospital planned it from March to July 1997. However, the cited 
rule for retroactive authorization applies to "transplantation services provided under 
unusual emergency circumstances." (Pet. Add. 53, emp. added.) Even Agency counsel 
construed this phrase to mean "unusual or emergency circumstances." (Tr. 15, emp. 
The Agency challenges the notion of "deemed waiver" of its prior authorization requirement, based 
upon its conduct that prevented compliance. (Br. of Aplee. 24-25.) However, the authorities for relief 
cited by the Hospital are not limited to the theory of "waiver," but apply to any theory for equitable relief. 
(See Pet. Br. 14-17.) While the Hospital may not have used the label of "waiver" in the administrative 
hearing, all the supporting facts and equitable arguments are the same. Moreover, the theory of waiver 
applies as well to the practice of retroactive authorization, which practice did manifest an intent to 
relinquish the right to strict enforcement of prior authorization, as discussed below. 
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added.) The word "unusual" must be given independent meaning and cannot be 
rendered superfluous by reading it out of the regulation. The facts of this case are 
certainly "unusual" in that the Agency prevented prior authorization by misrepresenting 
Sean's true eligibility status upon admission, and by failing to inform the Hospital of 
Sean's corrected status. Because the Hospital was thus prevented from obtaining prior 
authorization, the Agency's provision for retroactive authorization should apply to 
compensate for the Agency's own error. 
Even judged by the term "emergency circumstances," this case qualifies because 
Sean faced impending death. Moreover, the Hospital did not know in March, when 
chemotherapy began, that a transplant would be necessary; in fact, the hope was that 
chemotherapy would render a transplant unnecessary. Only after chemotherapy failed 
was the transplant option pursued, and much of the time between May and July was spent 
monitoring Sean's condition and searching for a bone marrow donor. (See Hospital 
letter, Pet. Add. 14-17.) Accordingly, the passage of time alone should not be viewed as 
diminishing the urgency or emergency nature of the situation. Moreover, the hearing 
officer made absolutely no finding of fact to support her conclusion that this is not an 
"unusual" or "emergency" case. (Concl. of Law No. 2.) Therefore, that conclusion must 
be set aside. See Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. Prior Agency Practice of Retroactive Authorization. 
Prior Agency practice provides a second, separate basis for retroactive 
authorization, independent of the regulation. As a matter of common cooperative 
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practice between the Agency and the Hospital, if the Hospital was unable to submit a 
prior authorization form because Medicaid eligibility had not yet been established, the 
Hospital would proceed with needed treatment and submit the form as soon as the 
Agency approved eligibility, without regard to unusual or emergency circumstances. 
Bernadette McNally so testified: 
Q. Have you, say, in the last year, had a situation where at the time 
of admission a patient was ineligible for Medicaid but later was determined 
to be eligible and then you submitted a request for retroactive prior 
authorization? Have you had that situation? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And was that approved? 
A. Yes, it was approved. [Tr. 70.] 
By denying retroactive authorization in this case, the Agency deviated from that prior 
practice. Moreover, the Agency presented no evidence at trial to justify the 
inconsistency, and the Hospital has certainly been "substantially prejudiced" by the 
inconsistent Agency action; therefore, this Court is required to grant relief. U.C.A. § 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
In summary, based on regulation and prior practice, the Agency was required to 
grant retroactive authorization of Sean's transplant, especially where the Agency's own 
conduct prevented prior authorization. The Agency's conclusion to the contrary is 
erroneous as a matter of law. 
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POINT III: THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRES 
RELIEF FROM THE AGENCY DECISION IN ORDER TO 
ACCOMPLISH JUSTICE IN THIS CASE. 
A. The Elements of Equitable Estoppel Are Satisfied. 
The Hospital demonstrated in its opening brief that equitable estoppel requires 
relief from the Agency decision in this case. (Pet. Br. 25-29.) Based on its 
misrepresentation that Sean was Medicaid ineligible upon admission, its failure to notify 
the Hospital upon correcting Sean's eligibility status, and its practice of retroactive 
authorization, the Agency is equitably estopped to deny authorization and withhold 
payment for Sean's transplant. 
The Agency argues that equitable estoppel should not apply because its agent, 
Debbie Lucero, "did not say or do anything" that was inconsistent with a later claim, or 
that would have precluded prior authorization. (Br. of Aplee. 28.) However, this 
assertion is contrary to the record and the express findings of the hearing officer. 
Richard Fairborn concluded from two different Agency sources, the Agency computer 
data and Debbie Lucero, that Sean was Medicaid ineligible upon admission. Mr. 
Fairborn testified that Lucero confirmed Sean was no longer eligible, that his eligibility 
was under review, and that a new application was required "to begin the process over 
again and then reestablish eligibility." (Tr. 21; see also Tr. 30-31.) Accordingly, 
regardless of the actual words Lucero used, the bottom-line conclusion was the same: 
Sean was no longer Medicaid eligible. The hearing officer expressly found that Lucero 
confirmed Sean's ineligibility. (Findings 5-7, Pet. Add. 4.) These Agency 
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representations prevented submission of a prior authorization request form because "we 
cannot request prior authorization if they're not enrolled in Medicaid." (Tr. 70.) Later 
that same day, Lucero reinstated Sean's Medicaid eligibility, and the Agency now takes 
the position that Sean was continuously eligible. (Tr. 14-15, 23, 58-60, 91; Pet. Add. 
27.) Therefore, the Agency's argument regarding the first element of estoppel is entirely 
unsupported by the record and manifests bad faith. 
The Agency next argues that the Hospital's reliance on the Agency's July 9 
misrepresentations was not reasonable because the Hospital should have checked on 
Sean's status again before the transplant on July 17. (Br. of Aplee. 28-30.) However, 
given Ms. Lucero's prior practice of notifying the Hospital of eligibility updates (Tr. 29), 
especially with a new application pending, the Hospital was justified in waiting one week 
for the Agency's response. The Agency again attempts to shift attention to the time prior 
to hospitalization (Br. of Aplee. 29), but to evaluate reasonable reliance, focus must 
properly be on the period after the representations on which reliance is claimed. Finally, 
the Agency asserts that "the Hospital's conduct cannot be deemed reasonable since it had 
knowledge of all the facts and events necessary" to obtain prior authorization. (Br. of 
Aplee. 30.) This assertion is utterly false and, again, manifests bad faith. The Hospital 
did not know the one fact it needed to submit a prior authorization request form-that 
Sean was Medicaid eligible on July 9, contrary to what the Agency had represented. 
The case of Roberts v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 653 So. 2d 956 (Ala. 1995), 
relied upon by the Agency, has nothing to do with Medicaid reimbursement or equitable 
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estoppel. The insured was denied coverage for a surgery because she failed to obtain the 
insurer's prior authorization. The court rejected her claim of fraudulent concealment 
because there was "a complete lack of evidence that anything Blue Cross did or did not 
do induced Roberts to act." Id. at 958. By contrast, the Agency in this case plainly 
induced the Hospital to forego a prior authorization form and to submit instead an 
application form to "reestablish eligibility." Instead of asserting that Sean was ineligible, 
the Agency should have stated that, while Sean's eligibility was under review, he 
remained eligible for the purpose of submitting a prior authorization request form. The 
Agency also focuses on the computer error and lack of insurer follow-up in Roberts. 
However, here, there was no computer error or any other excuse for the Agency's 
misrepresentations. Moreover, the insurer in Roberts had no policy or prior practice of 
following up on authorization requests or granting retroactive authorization. By contrast, 
the Agency here did have such prior practices, and the Hospital reasonably relied on 
those practices in waiting for the Agency's response. In short, Roberts does not involve 
the misrepresentations and prior practices that justify estoppel in this case. 
In summary, the Agency's conclusion that equitable estoppel does not apply finds 
no support in the record or the findings of fact and must be set aside. Adams v. Board of 
Review, supra. 
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B, Application of Estoppel to Government Entity. 
The Agency argues that even if the elements of equitable estoppel are satisfied, 
the injustice here is not of "sufficient gravity" to justify its application. (Br. of Aplee. 
32-36.) However, the Agency misapplies the relevant legal standards. 
In Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that estoppel may be invoked against a governmental entity in 
"unusual circumstances 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.'" Id. at 
827, quoting Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 
1990). Estoppel should be applied in such cases if "the facts may be found with such 
certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Id., 
quoting Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). See also 
Holland v. Career Service Rev. Bd., 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993) (estoppel 
applies against state institution when "it is plainly apparent that failing to apply the rule 
would result in manifest injustice"). In Anderson, estoppel did not apply because there 
was no clear evidence of any statement on which the plaintiff could have relied. 839 
P.2d at 827-28. In Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm fn, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1993), on 
which the Agency principally relies, this Court denied estoppel because the Tax 
Commission letter on which the taxpayer relied was based on erroneous information 
from the taxpayer. Id. at 908-09. Moreover, there was no "manifest injustice" because 
the taxpayer in fact owed the taxes. Id. at 909. 
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By contrast, this Court applied equitable estoppel in Eldredge v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., supra, because the Board clearly informed the plaintiff that he would not 
have to purchase the additional years of prior service, and the plaintiff reasonably relied 
on those communications in taking early retirement. 795 P.2d at 676. This Court 
observed that a government body charged with dispensing information in the 
administration of an important government program "bears a most stringent duty to 
abstain from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." Id. Similarly, in Celebrity Club, 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm % 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the court applied 
estoppel because the Commission issued a letter advising the plaintiff that its planned 
facility satisfied the statutory requirements, and the plaintiff relied on that representation 
in expending $200,000 to complete the facility. Id. at 694-95. 
The present case is more closely analogous to Eldredge and Celebrity Club than to 
Anderson and Orton. Here, the Hospital relied on two different sources of Agency 
information. First, Mr. Fairborn checked the Agency's computer data base, which 
showed that no Medicaid card had been issued for July and that Sean was not Medicaid 
eligible. In this computer age, the Agency's communication through its computer 
network, made available to the Hospital, has the same force and effect as the letters 
issued in Eldredge and Celebrity Club. Moreover, Mr. Fairborn verified Sean's status 
personally with Ms. Lucero, the Agency's Medicaid eligibility officer who is stationed at 
the Hospital for the very purpose of dispensing eligibility information to the Hospital. 
Ms. Lucero confirmed that Sean was not eligible, that his eligibility was under review, 
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and that a new application would have to be submitted to "reestablish eligibility." (Tr. 
21.) Absent Medicaid eligibility, the Hospital could not submit a prior authorization 
request form (Tr. 70); instead, in reliance on the Agency's representations of ineligibility, 
Mr. Fairborn obtained and submitted a new application form (Tr. 21-22, 27-28). Ms. 
Lucero subsequently reinstated Sean's eligibility, but she never notified the Hospital of 
that act (Tr. 29, 58-60); moreover, the Hospital had no way of knowing of Lucero's 
action because the Hospital has no access to the Agency's internal action logs (Tr. 49-
50). The Hospital also relied on the Agency's prior practices of notifying the Hospital of 
eligibility updates and retroactive authorization, as discussed above. 
These facts, clear and undisputed, and even supported by the hearing officer's 
findings (Findings 5-7, 10, 13-14, Pet. Add. 4-5), present a case of "manifest injustice." 
As a result of its reliance on the Agency's representations and prior practices, the 
Hospital did not submit a prior authorization request form, and the Agency is now 
withholding the $250,000 cost of Sean's transplant for failing to fax the form at the time 
of Sean's admission (Tr. 93-94). This loss exceeds the amounts at stake in Eldredge and 
Celebrity Club. Moreover, there is no question regarding the representations, as in 
Anderson, supra, and those representations are not based on faulty information from the 
plaintiff, as in Orton, supra. In addition, fairness requires that the Hospital be paid for its 
good faith services rendered in a time of grave need to a little boy. The Agency has 
identified no serious public harm that would result from paying the Hospital for its 
admittedly necessary and appropriate services. By contrast, denial of payment will cause 
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a serious loss of faith in the system and deter future participation by medical providers. 
Accordingly, the injustice of withholding payment is "manifest" and sufficiently grave to 
justify application of equitable estoppel In addition to cases cited in Petitioner's Brief, 
see Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 613 P.2d 495, 499-500 (Or. App. 
1980) (holding that equitable estoppel may apply to state agency that denied payment for 
medical services for lack of prior authorization). 
In summary, the conditions for applying equitable estoppel to a government 
agency plainly exist in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Agency decision denying the Hospital reimbursement 
for Sean's bone marrow transplant must be reversed. The necessity and appropriateness 
of the services are undisputed, and withholding payment simply for not faxing a form 
prior to the service is unauthorized and does not further the Agency's interest in 
"efficient" operation of the Medicaid program. Lack of prior authorization alone is a 
particularly inadequate basis to withhold payment when the Agency's own 
misrepresentations precluded timely submission of the authorization request form. The 
Agency's decision must also be set aside because of its deviation from the prior practices 
of notifying the Hospital of eligibility updates and retroactive authorization. Finally, 
because denial of payment on the undisputed facts of this case creates a manifest 
injustice, this Court should apply equitable estoppel to prevent that injustice. 
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Respectfully submitted this ~7~^ day of June, 1999 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: -&s<*«^4(t & ^ C ^ g o v v . 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Petitioner 
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Jean Hendricksen 
Assistant Attorney General 
HK Systems Building, 8th Floor 
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P.O. Box 140835 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0835 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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December24, 1997 
Ted W. Keyes, M.D. 
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
50 North Medical Drive 
Saltiake City, Utah 84132 
Re: Sean Daugaard 
Medicaid # 0302605602 
BUREAU OF COVERAGE & REIMBURSEMENT POLICY 
UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT UNIT 
288 North 1460 West, Box 142904 
Salt Lukts City, Utah 84114-2904 
Telephone: (801) 538-6123 
UMU-1710-97-U 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Dear Dr. Keyes: 
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF 
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA 
This letter is to advise you Medicaid denies your request for funding for bone marrow 
transplantation for the above-mentioned client. The following criteria have not been 
met: 
R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization 
1) Life Expectancy 
R414-10A-6(3)(c): Medical literature from the transplant center documenting the 
client's life expectancy, with and without a transplant. The transplant center staff 
must complete and submit to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a 
medical literature review documenting a probability of successful clinical 
outcome for patients receiving transplantation for the specific age group, specific 
diagnosjs.(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. 
This review of the medical literature must document an increase in life 
expectancy between control group(s) and transplantation group(s). The 
Department shall use independent research by medical consultant(s) to evaluate 
the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
0000002 
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2) Survival Rate Literature Reviews 
R414-lOA-6f3)(o): The transplant center must document, by a current medical 
literature review, a one-year survival rate from patients having received 
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client. Survival rate must be calculated by the 
Kaplan-Meier product-limit method or the actuarial life table method: "Kaplan, G. 
Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of 
American Statistical Association 53:457-481,1958. Cox, D.R., Oakes, D. 
Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated 
by reference. At least ten patients in the appropriate age group must be alive at 
the end of the one or three year period to document adequate confidence 
intervals. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical 
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
R414-lOA*6f3Mq): Bone marrow transplantation centers must document, by a 
current medical literature review, a one-year and a three-year survival rate from 
patients having received transplantation for the age group, specific 
diagnosis(es), condition and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The 
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to 
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
3) Written Recommendations 
R414-10A-6f3Ur): The transplant center must provide written recommendations 
for each client which support the need for the transplant. The recommendations 
must reflect use of both the transplant center's own patient selection criteria and 
the Utah Medicaid program criteria as noted in R414-10A-8 through 22. 
Agreement of the transplant center to provide the required service must also be 
established. 
R414-10A-9: Criteria and Contraindications for Bone Marrow 
Transplantation. 
4) Survival Rate Literature Review 
R414-10A-9(2Ka)(iii): The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to 
the Department for evaluation, a current medical literature review, documenting 
a probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater than or equal to 
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75 percent one-year survival rate, or by having a greater than or equal to 55 
percent three-year survival rate or by meeting the one-year and three-year 
survival rates for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation for the age 
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for 
the client. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical 
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
5) Life Expectancy and Medical Literature Review 
R414-A10-9(3): The client for bone marrow transplantation must also meet 
requirements of R414-10A-9f3Ma) or fbl. 
a) The client must have irreversible, progressive bone marrow disease with a 
life expectancy of one year or less without transplantation or must have greater 
than a five year increase in life expectancy with transplantation, with no other 
reasonable medical or surgical alternative to transplantation available. 
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to the 
Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical literature rev|ew; 
documenting that the client's condition will cause irreversible, progressive 
disease to vital end-organs within two years following the application for 
transplant and have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to 
transplantation available. The medical literature must also document that the 
bone marrow transplantation will prevent irreversible, progressive disease to the 
client's vital end-organs and must document that it will increase the life 
expectancy of the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use 
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the 
documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
6) Any single contraindication listed below precludes approval for Medicaid 
payment for bone marrow transplantation: 
R414-lOA-9(5)fh) Cancer, unless treated and eradicated for two or more years 
or unless a current medical literature review, completed by the transplant center 
staff and submitted to the Department for staff review and evaluation, documents 
a greater than or equal to 75% one-year survival rate, or a greater than or equal 
to 55 percent three-year survival rate, or by meeting the one-year and three-year 
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Ted Keyes, M.D. 
December 24,1997 
Page 4 
survival rates after transplantation for the age group, specific cancer, 
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The 
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to 
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
If you disagree with this decision you may request a hearing to appeal this decision. 
To obtain the hearing you must complete the. enclosed Request For A Hearing Form 
and file it with: 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Attention: Formal Hearings 
Box 142901 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2901 
The request must be filed within 30 days after the date of this letter. You may 
represent yourself, or you may use legal counsel, a relative, friend, or a spokes person 
to represent you. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal hearing will 
constitute a waiver of your rights to a formal hearing. 
Sincerely, 
Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S. 
Health Program Manager 
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy 
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing Form 
cc. Parents of Sean Daugaard 
4625 North Woodenshoe Road 
Kamas, UT 84061 
MCR/bh 
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January 7,1998 
Ann G. Petersen, RN, MS 
Health Program Manager 
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy 
288 North 1460 West Box 142904 
•Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-2904 
Re: Sean Daugaard 
Medicaid #0302605602 
Dear Ms. Petersen, 
In your letter of 12/24/97 you have asked for further documentation of life expectancy and 
literature support for transplant for Sean Daugaard. On 12/8/971 sent you two articles and a letter 
reviewing both of these articles and going over the survival data as it applies to Sean and as it 
meets the requirements of Medicaid. I have outlined specific figures on specific pages that 
document better survival than Medicaid requirements. I am at a loss about how I can be clearer 
about the contents these articles. If you need additional information other than what I have sent, I 
would be happy to provide it but I have already provided the information ?hat you asked for in 
your 12/24/97 letter. I would appreciate your attention to this matter and approval of this therapy 
as soon as possible. If there are additional questions that I have not answered yet I would be very 
happy to answer them. 
Sincerely, 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^O 
''Roberta H, Adams, MD 
Director, Pediatric Blood and Marrow Transplant 
RHA:ab 
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March 4,1998 CERTIFIED MAIL 
Ted W. Keyes, M.D. 
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
50 North Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132 
Re: Sean Daugaard 
Medicaid # 0302605602 
SUBJECT: AMENDED NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF 
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA 
Dear Dr. Keyes: 
R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization 
1) Prior Authorization 
R414-10A-6(1): Prior authorization is required for all transplantation services 
except for cornea and kidney transplantation. 
2) Life Expectancy 
R414-10A-6(3)(c): Medical literature from the transplant center documenting the 
client's life expectancy, with and without a transplant. The transplant center staff 
must complete and submit to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a 
medical literature review documenting a probability of successful clinical 
outcome for patients receiving transplantation for the specific age group, specific 
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. 
This review of the medical literature must document an increase in life 
expectancy between control group(s) and transplantation group(s). The 
Department shall use independent research by medical consultant(s) to evaluate 
the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
Ted Keyes, M.D. 
March 4,1998 
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The medical literature received does not document a five year increase in 
life expectancy for children with biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia 
with testicular relapse treated with standard therapy as compared to 
children with matched unrelated bone marrow transplantation. 
3) Survival Rate Literature Reviews 
R414-10A-6(3)(o): The transplant center must document, by a current medical 
literature review, a one-year survival rate from patients having received 
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client. Survival rate must be calculated by the 
Kaplan-Meier product-limit method or the actuarial life table method: "Kaplan, G., 
Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of 
American Statistical Association 53:457-481,1958, Cox, D.R., Oakes, D. 
Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated 
by reference. At least ten patients in the appropriate age group must be alive at 
the end of the one or three year period to document adequate confidence 
intervals. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical 
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
R414-10A-6(3)(q): Bone marrow transplantation centers must document, by a 
current medical literature review, a one-year and a three-year survival rate from 
patients having received transplantation for the age group, specific 
diagnosis(es), condition and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The 
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to 
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal 
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal to 55 percent 
three year survival rate for children receiving a matched unrelated bone 
marrow transplantation for biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with 
testicular relapse. 
4) Written Recommendations 
R414-10A-6(3)(r): The transplant center must provide written recommendations 
for each client which support the need for the transplant. The recommendations 
must reflect use of both the transplant center's own patient selection criteria and 
the Utah Medicaid program criteria as noted in R414-10A-8 through 22. 
Ted Keyes, M.D. 
March 4,1998 
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Agreement of the transplant center to provide the required service must also be 
established. 
The medical literature received does not document a five year increase in 
life expectancy for children with biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia 
with testicular relapse treated with standard therapy as compared to 
children with matched unrelated bone marrow transplantation. 
The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal 
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal to three year 
survival rate for children receiving a matched unrelated bone marrow 
transplantation fpr bophenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with 
testicular relapse. 
R414-10A-9: Criteria and Contraindications for Bone Marrow 
Transplantation. 
5) Survival Rate Literature Review 
R414-10A-9(2)(a)(iii): The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to 
the Department for evaluation, a current medical literature review, documenting 
a probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater than or equal to 
75 percent one-year survival rate, or by having a greater than or equal to 55 
percent three-year survival rate or by meeting the one-year and three-year 
survival rates for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation for the age 
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for 
the client. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical 
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal 
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal to 55 percent 
three year survival rate for children receiving a matched unrelated bone 
marrow transplantation for biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with 
testicular relapse. 
Ted Keyes, M.D. 
March 4,1998 
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6) Life Expectancy and Medical Literature Review 
R414-A10-9(3): The client for bone marrow transplantation must also meet 
requirements of R414-10A-9(3)(a) or (b). 
a) The client must have irreversible, progressive bone marrow disease with a 
life expectancy of one year or less without transplantation or must have greater 
than a five year increase in life expectancy with transplantation, with no other 
reasonable medical or surgical alternative to transplantation available. 
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to the 
Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical literature review 
documenting that the client's condition will cause irreversible, progressive 
disease to vital end-organs within two years following the application for 
transplant and have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to 
transplantation available. The medical literature must also document that the 
bone marrow transplantation will prevent irreversible, progressive disease to the 
client's vital end-organs and must document that it will increase the life 
expectancy of the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use 
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the 
documentation submitted by ihe transplant center. 
The medical literature received does not document a five year increase in 
life expectancy for children with biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia 
with testicular relapse treated with standard therapy as compared to 
children with matched unrelated bone marrow transplantation. 
7) Any single contraindication listed below precludes approval for Medicaid 
payment for bone marrow transplantation: 
R414-10A-9(5)(h): Cancer, unless treated and eradicated for two or more years 
or unless a current medical literature review, completed by the transplant center 
staff and submitted to the Department for staff review and evaluation, documents 
a greater than or equal to 75% one-year survival rate, or a greater than or equal 
to 55 percent three-year survival rate, or by meeting the one-year and three-year 
survival rates after transplantation for the age group, specific cancer, 
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The 
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to 
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
Ted Keyes, M.D. 
March 4, 1998 
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The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal 
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal 55 percent 
three year survival for children receiving a matched unrelated bone marrow 
transplantation for biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with testicular 
relapse. 
If you disagree with this decision you may request a hearing to appeal this decision. 
To obtain the hearing you must complete the enclosed Request For A Hearing Form 
and file it with: 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Attention: Formal Hearings 
PO Box 142901 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2901 
The request must be filed within 30 days after the date of this letter. You may 
represent yourself, or you may use legal counsel, a relative, friend, or a spokes person 
to represent you. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal hearing will 
constitute a waiver of your rights to a formal hearing. 
Sincerely, 
Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S. 
Health Program Manager 
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy 
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing form 
cc: Parents of Sean Daugaard 
4625 North Woodenshoe Road 
Kamas, UT 84061 
MCR/bh 
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July 23, 1998 CERTIFIED MAIL 
Ted W. Keyes, M.D. 
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
50 North Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132 
Re: Sean Daugaard 
Medicaid # 0302605602 
SUBJECT: AMENDED NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF 
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA 
Dear Dr. Keyes: 
This letter is to advise you Medicaid denies your request for funding for bone marrow 
transplantation for the above-mentioned client. The following criteria have not been 
met: 
The following rules and criteria are applicable: 
R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization 
1) Prior Authorization Request 
R414-10A-6(1): Prior authorization is required for all transplantation services 
except for cornea and kidney transplantation. 
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Prior authorization was not requested before the transplantation was 
performed. 
Sincerely, 
Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S. 
Health Program Manager 
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy 
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing foam 
cc: Parents of Sean Daugaard 
4625 North Woodenshoe Road 
Kamas, UT 84061 
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